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The Federal Communications Act and the
Broadcast of Aborted Fetus Advertisements
Hille von Rosenvinge Sheppardt

During the 1992 election season, candidates for federal office
in seventeen different states ran graphic television advertisements
depicting aborted fetuses.1 Indiana Republican congressional candidate Michael Bailey ran an advertisement that showed tweezers
picking through a petri dish containing the crushed head, legs, and
arms of an aborted fetus while a woman's voice said, "It's my body
. . .it's a woman's choice."' In Georgia, Republican congressional
candidates Daniel Becker, Jimmy Fisher, and Mark Myers each
ran an advertisement showing "Choice A," a smiling baby, and
"Choice B," a fully developed fetus purportedly aborted in the last
weeks of pregnancy.8
Television stations balked at the prospect of running such
graphic advertisements. Nevertheless, the stations ran the advertisements because section 312(a)(7) of the Federal Communications Act (the "Act")" guarantees candidates who run for federal
elected office an affirmative right of reasonable access to television
stations.5 Moreover, these stations were forced to run the advertisements unedited because section 315 of the Act prohibits the
censoring of political advertisements.
The broadcast of aborted-fetus advertisements during the
campaign season generated much controversy. Stations that ran

t A.B. 1991, A.M. 1991, University of Chicago; J.D. Candidate 1994, University of
Chicago.
Graphic abortion advertisements ran in California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Montana, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada,
New Jersey, Ohio, and Tennessee. Nightline, ABC News (Aug 31, 1992).
3 FCC to Make Ruling That Could Damage Bailey Abortion-Ad Campaign, 13 Indianapolis Bus J 13A, 14A (Aug 17, 1992). See also The Abortion Ad Question, Electronic Media
12 (Aug 24, 1992).
Ellen Whitford, Indiana Candidate's Win Inspired Anti-Abortion Ads, Atlanta J and
Const Al (July 8,1992).
' Communications Act, Pub L No 73-416, 48 Stat 1064 (1934), codified at 47 USC
§§ 151 et seq (1988).
6 47 USC § 312(a)(7).
- 47 USC § 315.
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the advertisements received "hundreds of viewer complaints."'7 Additionally, both candidates running the advertisements and their
opponents received enormous responses in the form of money donations and complaints.8
Stations that did not wish to run the graphic abortion advertisements sought help from both the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") and the courts. The FCC,
however, rejected the stations' claim, holding in August 1992 that
advertisements depicting aborted fetuses are not indecent and,
therefore, must be shown uncensored." In October 1992, however,
Judge Robert Hall of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia ruled that one particularly graphic
advertisement depicting a four-minute live abortion was indecent
and therefore exempt from the broadcast requirement. 10
This Comment uses aborted-fetus advertisements as a case
study for examining the limits and requirements of the Federal
Communications Act provisions that govern political campaign advertising. Part I explores the statutory language of section 315 and
the case law interpreting it. Part II considers whether indecent,
violent, violence-inciting, misleading, or sham-candidate advertisements constitute exceptions to the no-censorship rule, and concludes that aborted-fetus advertisements do not fall within any of
these possible exceptions. Part III outlines several proposals for reform that would allow broadcast stations to refuse to run abortedfetus political advertisements.
I. THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS ACT: SEEMINGLY ABSOLUTE

Sections 312(a)(7) and 315 of the Federal Communications Act
together require licensed broadcast stations to run, uncensored, the
advertisements of political candidates for federal office. Section
312(a)(7) grants legally qualified candidates for federal elective office an affirmative right of reasonable access to broadcasting stations to run their political advertisements.1" Section 315, moreover,
" Nightline (cited in note 1). See also Gillett Communications of Atlanta, Inc. v
Becker, 807 F Supp 757, 763 (N D Ga 1992). WAGA-TV in Atlanta, after airing Becker's
one-minute spot, received many calls that "were longer and more involved than those which
the station usually receives in response to programming."
a Whitford, Atlanta J and Const at Al (cited in note 3).
Letter to Vincent A. Pepper, 7 FCC Rec 5599 (Aug 21, 1992).
Gillett Communications, 807 F Supp at 763.
" Section 312(a)(7) provides only federal candidates with a guaranteed right of access
to broadcast stations. However, stations may .also have to provide candidates for state and
local offices reasonable access in order to function in the public interest. See, for example,
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explicitly provides that stations airing such political advertisements have "no power of censorship over the material
broadcast."' 2
The courts have construed these provisions strictly. In Farmers Educationaland Cooperative Union v WDAY, Inc., 3 the Supreme Court held that stations, if they are to comply with section
315, cannot censor political advertisements.' In Farmers Educational, the Court addressed a libel suit brought against a station
that did not censor defamatory material from a candidate's advertisement. The station was forced to choose between conflicting legal duties: on the one hand, section 315 required it to broadcast
political advertisements uncensored; on the other hand, state law
imposed civil liability for broadcasting libelous material. The
Farmers Educational Court held that section 315 superseded the
station's duty under state law to refrain from broadcasting libelous
material:
Because of the time limitation inherent in a political
campaign, erroneous decisions by a station could not be
corrected by the courts promptly enough to permit the
candidate to bring improperly excluded matter before the
public.. . . [AIllowing censorship, even of the attenuated
type advocated here, would almost inevitably force a candidate to avoid controversial issues during political debates over radio and television, and hence restrict the

State v University of Maine, 266 A2d 863, 868 (1970). Section 315 is not limited to federal
candidates, but instead prohibits selective station censorship of the campaign advertisements of legally qualified candidates for public office.
" 47 USC § 315. Additionally, the legislative history of section 315 "shows a deep hostility to censorship either by the Commission or by a licensee." Farmers Educational and
Cooperative Union v WDAY, Inc., 360 US 525, 528 (1959), quoting S Rep No 1567, 80th
Cong, 2d Sess 13-14 (1948). The Senate Report explicated this anti-censorship position:

The flat prohibition against the licensee of any station exercising any censorship
authority over any political or public question discussion is retained and emphasized. This means that the Commission cannot itself or by rule or regulation require the licensee to censor, alter, or in any manner affect or control the subject

matter of any such broadcast and the licensee may not in his own discretion exercise any such censorship authority.
360 US at 525.

13

1"Id at 527. "The term censorship,

..

as commonly understood, connotes any exami-

nation of thought or expression in order to prevent publication of 'objectionable' material.

We find no clear expression of legislative intent, nor any other convincing reason to indicate
Congress meant to give 'censorship' a narrower meaning in Section 315." Id (emphasis in
original).
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coverage of consideration relevant to intelligent political
decision.1 5
The Court further held that because section 315 required the station to broadcast the libelous material, the station could not be
held civilly liable for doing so. 6
In Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v FCC,7 the Court reaffirmed this strict understanding of section 315: "[Section 315],
which has been part of the law since 1927 . . . has been held valid
by this Court as an obligation of the licensee relieving him of any
power in any way to prevent or censor the broadcast."'8 In so
holding, the Supreme Court suggested that section 315, as reflected
in its statutory language, absolutely prohibits station censorship of
candidate political advertisements.
II.

POSSIBLE EXCEPTIONS TO SECTION

315

While section 315 appears to embody an absolute requirement
that stations show all candidate political advertisements uncensored, there may nonetheless exist some exceptions to that rule.
While neither the FCC nor the courts have definitively ruled on
any of these possible exceptions, this Part explores whether obscene, indecent, violent, violence-inciting, misleading, or shamcandidate advertisements might constitute exceptions to section
315.
A.

Obscenity and Indecency

In order for a publication to be legally obscene, an average
person applying contemporary community standards must find
that, taken as a whole, it appeals to the prurient interest, contains
patently offensive depictions or descriptions of specified sexual
conduct, and has no serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.' 9 The FCC defines an indecent broadcast as one that contains "language or material that, in context, depicts or describes, in
terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community

1'Id at 530-31.
'e 360 US at 531.
17

395 US 367 (1969).

18 Id at 391 (emphasis added).

19 Miller v California, 413 US 15, 24 (1973).
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standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities
or organs." 0
As with libelous political advertisements, stations must choose
between conflicting broadcast obligations when presented with obscene or indecent political advertisements. On the one hand, stations must air the political advertisements uncensored in order to
comply with section 315. Indeed, stations face losing their licenses
if they fail to comply. 2 1 On the other hand, stations may not, under

section 1464 of the Federal Criminal Code, broadcast obscene or
indecent material;2 2 if they broadcast such material, they face not
only the threat of losing their licenses, but also possible criminal
penalties.2
Although it is difficult to determine which provision controls,
this Comment concludes that the criminal indecency statute
should supersede the Federal Communications Act's no-censorship
provisions. Thig Comment posits, however, that aborted-fetus ad10In the Matter of Goodrich Broadcasting, Inc., 6 FCC Rec 7484 (1991). See also Infinity Broadcasting Corporation of Pennsylvania, 2 FCC Rec 2705 (1987). The Supreme
Court applied this definition of indecency in FCC v Pacifica Foundation,438 US 726 (1978).
" Section 312(a)(7) authorizes the FCC to revoke any station license or construction
permit for failing to provide candidates for federal office reasonable access to the broadcast
facility. Section 312(a)(4) allows the FCC to revoke any station license or construction permit "for willful or repeated violation of, or willful or repeated failure to observe any provision of this chapter, or any rule or regulation of the Commission authorized by this chapter
or by a treaty ratified by the United States." 47 USC § 312(a)(4). Section 401(b) gives both
the United States and private citizens causes of action when any station disobeys FCC orders. 47 USC § 401(b) (1988). Section 501 penalizes violations of Chapter 47 with fines or
imprisonment. 47 USC § 501 (1988). See Kennedy for President Committee v FCC, 636 F2d
432 (DC Cir 1980) (approving license-revocation for non-compliance).
" 18 USC § 1464 (1988) ("section 1464"). This provision applies to stations that broadcast via radio waves, namely radio and television stations. It does not apply to cable
television.
Based on its finding that children may be in the television viewing audience at any
time, Congress outlawed the broadcast of indecent material completely. Helms Adult Radio
Amendment, Pub L No 100-459, 102 Stat 2186 (1988). The 24-hour ban was found unconstitutional in Action for Children's Television v FCC, 852 F2d 1332 (DC Cir 1988) ("ACT "),
vacated by Action for Children's Television v FCC, 932 F2d 1504 (DC Cir 1991) ("ACT II")
(ACT I's essential holding was preserved). ACT I held that a complete restriction on the
broadcast of indecent material violated the First Amendment, but upheld the FCC's authority to prohibit the broadcast of indecent material at times when there is a reasonable risk
that children are in the audience. See Comment, Regulation of Indecent Radio Broadcasts:
George Carlin Revisited- What Does the Future Hold for the Seven 'Dirty' Words?, 65 Tul
L Rev 131 (1990).
23 18 USC § 1464 ("Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by
means of radio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than two years, or both."). Section 312(a)(6) allows the FCC to revoke a station's license or
construction permit for violating section 1464, and section 312(b) allows the FCC to issue a
cease and desist order. See 47 USC § 312(a)(6); 47 USC § 312(b). In addition, violators of
section 1464 are liable for a forfeiture penalty under 47 USC § 503(b)(1)(D) (1992).
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vertisements do not fall within the FCC's current understanding of
"obscenity" or "indecency."
1. Section 1464 should trump sections 312(a)(7) and 315.
In FCC v Pacifica Foundation, the Supreme Court held that
the FCC could constitutionally restrict the daytime broadcast of
indecent material in accordance with section 1464 without violating the Federal Communications Act's general command in section
.326 that the FCC have no censorship power over broadcasted material. 5 In Pacifica, the Court addressed the constitutionality of
regulating the 2:00 p.m. radio broadcast of a monologue by comedian George Carlin that was aptly entitled "Filthy Words." In the
monologue, Carlin identified the "seven dirty words" that one cannot say on the airwaves. The Court held that the words were indecent and that the FCC could sanction their broadcast. The
Pacifica Court rested its holding on two facts:
First, the broadcast media have established a uniquely
pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans. Patently
offensive, indecent material presented over the airwaves
confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in the
privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be
left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights
of an intruder. .

.

. Second, broadcasting is uniquely ac-

cessible to children, even those too young to read. 6
Pacifica further held that viewer-discretion warnings do not
make indecent material suitable for daytime broadcast. The Court
reasoned that
[b]ecause the broadcast audience is constantly tuning in
and out, prior warnings cannot completely protect the listener or viewer from unexpected program content. To say
that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is like saying that
the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first
blow.

27

21 438 US at 726.
" Id at 738.

16 Id at 748-49. The FCC has subsequently recognized that "the linchpin of indecency
enforcement is the protection of children from inappropriate broadcast material." In the
Matter of Liability of SagittariusBroadcastingCorp, 7 FCC Rec 6873 (1992), citing ACT I,
852 F2d at 1340.
11 Pacifica, 438 US at 748-49.
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Additionally, while viewer-discretion warnings might help the conscientious parent monitor his child's viewing, the warnings are
helpful only if the parent is present while his child is watching
television.
The FCC has not yet definitively indicated whether stations
might be justified in refusing to run obscene or indecent political
advertisements. The FCC has addressed this question twice, first
with respect to a racial epithet and more recently in the context of
aborted-fetus advertisements. The full Commission, however, has
not made a definitive determination on this issue, nor has either
ruling been approved by the courts.
In In re Complaint by Julian Bond,28 the FCC refused to expand its definition of indecency to include the word "nigger." The
FCC said that "even if the Commission were to find the word 'nigger' to be 'obscene' or 'indecent,' in light of Section 315 we may not
prevent a candidate from utilizing that word during his 'use' of a
licensee's broadcast facilities." 29 This case suggests two possible
readings. First, it might stand for the proposition that section 315
prohibits any censorship of indecent material contained in political
advertisements. Second, it could mean only that the FCC itself
cannot prohibit the broadcast of such an advertisement, because
doing so would violate section 326's prohibition of FCC censorship;
a station, however, could nonetheless refuse to broadcast an indecent political advertisement without facing sanctions for violating
sections 312(a)(7) or 315. The first reading more likely represents
the FCC's view, because the FCC based its determination of its
inability to censor indecent political advertisements on section 315
rather than section 326. Julian Bond therefore suggests that the
FCC views section 315 as absolute.
The FCC may be backing away from this position. In a particularly graphic aborted-fetus case involving an advertisement for
Georgia congressional candidate Daniel Becker that depicted a
four-minute live abortion, the FCC indicated that section 1464
should override section 315:
[The] Commission's staff . . . informally opined that
'[t]he application of both traditional norms of statutory
construction as well as an analysis of the legislative
evolution of Section 315 militates in favor of reading
69 FCC2d 943 (1978).
" Id at 944. Of course, because the FCC concluded that the word "nigger" is not inde-

2

cent, its conclusion that section 315 is absolute is dictum.
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[the] Section 1464 [prohibition of the broadcast of indecent or obscene material] as an exception to Section
315.'

"30

The FCC further stated that " 'a broadcaster would be justified in
refusing access to a candidate who intended to utter obscene or
indecent language.' ,,' In so holding, the FCC indicated, albeit
without a formal ruling, that section 1464 should override section
315.

The Supreme Court's decision in Farmers Educational does
not preclude such an interpretation because obscene or indecent
political advertisements are clearly distinguishable from the defamatory advertisements which the Farmers Educational Court
considered. 2 Obscene and indecent political advertisements present stations with a choice between following conflicting congressional mandates. Defamatory advertisements, on the other hand,
present stations with a choice between following federal law or
state law. Farmers Educational held that a station could not be
held liable under state law for broadcasting uncensored political
advertisements as required by federal law, because doing so "would
sanction the unconscionable result of permitting civil and perhaps
criminal liability to be imposed for the very conduct the statute
demands of the licensee." ' Because stations cannot comply both
with sections 312(a)(7) and 315 and with section 1464 if the political advertisement in question is obscene or indecent, they must be
with a contold which to obey; to sanction stations for complying
34
gressional mandate would be "unconscionable.

Farmers Educational held that section 315 prohibits stations
from censbring defamatory political advertisements principally because the time constraints of political campaigns prevent courts
from adequately rectifying stations' erroneous decisions. 5 The
problem of rectifying erroneous decisions does not disappear when
the underlying material is obscene or indecent rather than libelous.
However, because the possibility of error is smaller and the harms
sought to be prevented are greater for obscene and indecent ma80 Letter to Daniel Becker, 7 FCC Rec 7282 (1992), quoting Letter from Mark S.
Fowler to Honorable Thomas A. Luken (Jan 19, 1984).
3' Gillett Communications, 807 F Supp at 762, quoting a January 6, 1984 Memorandum by FCC Staff.
12 See discussion of Farmers Educational in notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
" Farmers Educational, 360 US at 531.
54 Id.

" Id at 530-31.
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terial than for defamatory material, the time problem is not as
compelling.
For obscene or indecent political advertisements, errors will
arise from differences in legal interpretation, not bad investigation.
Broadcast stations are less likely to make erroneous decisions regarding obscene or indecent material than regarding libelous material because stations can measure advertisements against the relatively straightforward definition of indecency and thereby make
correct determinations about what is indecent. " For libelous advertisements, on the other hand, stations must make factual inquiries into the truth or falsity of a statement; such inquiries are
37
more likely to yield erroneous results.
Balancing the interests identified in Pacifica with a candidate's right to air uncensored political advertisements seems to
militate against requiring the broadcast of obscene or indecent political advertisements. In Pacifica, the Supreme Court held that indecent political speech may be restricted despite its political character." Thus, inserting prohibited speech into political speech does
not save the prohibited speech. This reasoning should extend to
political advertisements. The harms that result from the broadcast
of obscene or indecent material-invasion of privacy and the exposure of children to harmful material-are not diminished by the
fact that the material is included in a political advertisement. As
such, obscene or indecent political advertisements should not be
"6The FCC's definition of indecency (see text accompanying note 20) requires stations
to determine whether broadcast material depicts or describes sexual or excretory material or
organs. Because all obscene material would come within the broader definition of what is
indecent, stations need only inquire about indecency.
37 Additionally, the harms sought to be prevented by imposing sanctions upon the
broadcast of obscene and indecent material are greater than those for libelous material. In
the case of libel, the primary harm is to the person libeled; while the individual has a great
interest in not having the libel broadcast, society's interest is not as great. In the case of
obscenity or indecency, however, the primary harm is to the viewing audience, especially
children; society thus has a strong interest in preventing the broadcast of this material.
These distinctions justify giving broadcast stations censorship power over obscene or indecent material but -not libelous material and would explain why Farmers Educational does
not demand that sections 312(a)(7) and 315 be given priority in the case of obscene or indecent political advertisements.
31 The Court held:
The [Carlin] monologue does present a point of view; it attempts to show that the
words it uses are 'harmless' and that our attitudes toward them are 'essentially
silly.' . . . The belief that these words are harmless does not necessarily confer a
First Amendment privilege to use them while proselytizing, just as the conviction
that obscenity is harmless does not license one to communicate that conviction by
the indiscriminate distribution of an obscene leaflet.
Pacifica, 438 US at 746 n 22.
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broadcast uncensored. Thus, section 1464 should trump section
315.

2. Aborted-fetus advertisements are not obscene 'or
indecent.
Even if section 1464 overrides section 315, stations will not be
able to refuse to broadcast aborted-fetus advertisements because
such advertisements do not fall within the current legal definitions
of "obscene" or "indecent." In order for a publication to be obscene, an average person applying contemporary community standards must find that the publication appeals to the prurient interest, contains patently offensive depictions or descriptions of
specified sexual conduct, and has no serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 9 Aborted-fetus advertisements do not appeal to the prurient interest, nor do they contain depictions or descriptions of sexual conduct. Additionally, aborted-fetus
advertisements arguably have some political value, for they allow
political candidates to express a pro-life position and to illustrate
their view that abortion is the violent taking of human life. As
such, aborted-fetus advertisements are not obscene.
A more difficult question is whether aborted-fetus advertisements are indecent. The FCC's definition of indecency limits indecent material to profanity, sexual acts, sexual organs, and excrement.4 ° Advertisements displaying aborted fetuses clearly do not
depict profanity, sexual acts, or sexual organs."' Moreover, in Letter to Vincent A. Pepper,42 the FCC, in holding that an abortedfetus advertisement run by Georgia Republican congressional candidate Daniel Becker was not indecent, found that aborted fetuses
" Miller, 413 US at 24.
40 See note 20 and accompanying text. The FCC's definition of indecency requires that

the material be used "in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards for the broadcast medium." Goodrich Broadcasting, 6 FCC Rec at 7484. This
requirement allows the broadcast of things that are otherwise within the definition of indecency. For instance, female genitalia have been shown during programs depicting live births,
and exposed breasts have been shown during programs on African tribes. While both female
genitalia and breasts are technically within the definition of indecency, the two contexts
described above constitute exceptions to indecency because they do not offend society;
neither situation depicts body parts in a manner "patently offensive as measured by con-'
temporary community standards for the broadcast medium." Id.
11 It is possible that fetuses aborted during the third trimester may have sexual organs
and therefore fall technically within the indecency definition, although this argument has
not been made in any of the cases about the broadcast of aborted-fetus political

advertisements.
" 7 FCC Rec at 5599.
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are not excrement."3 In so holding, the FCC rejected the petition of
over 300 broadcasters who argued that programming "containing
graphic and shocking depictions of dead, bloodied or aborted fetuses or of any . . . tissue" constitutes excretory activity because
dead fetuses are covered with "menstrual gore."'
Another aborted-fetus advertisement aired by Becker, a
thirty-minute political program entitled "Abortion in America:
The Real Story," became the subject of two separate lawsuits in
October 1992, just two months after Pepper.Becker had requested
WAGA-TV in Atlanta, Georgia to air his advertisement on Sunday, November 1, 1992, immediately following a football game between the Atlanta Falcons and the Los Angeles Rams.' 5 In the first
suit, Gillett Communications, WAGA-TV sued Becker in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
to enjoin Becker from requiring the station to broadcast his advertisement, which the station considered to be indecent. In the second suit, Letter to Daniel Becker,"6 Becker petitioned the FCC to
force WAGA-TV to broadcast the advertisement.
In Gillett Communications, Judge Robert Hall agreed with
WAGA-TV that Becker's thirty-minute program was indecent, and
therefore enjoined Becker from requiring WAGA-TV to air his advertisement except during the safe-harbor period.' 7 Gillett Communications therefore appears to contradict Pepper, in which the
FCC held that aborted-fetus advertisements are not indecent. 8
According to Judge Hall, Becker's program, which contained
graphic footage of a four-minute live abortion, fell within the
FCC's indecency definition because it "contain[ed] graphic depictions and descriptions of female genitalia, the uterus, [and] excreted uterine fluid.' 4 9 Judge Hall also recognized the relevance of
"dismembered fetal body parts, and aborted fetuses" in rendering
the performance of a live abortion "patently offensive according to
contemporary community standards."5 0 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's ruling 1 and, without comment, Su40 Id.

" Id, citing Petition for Declaratory Ruling filed by Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays &
Handler.
,5 Whitford, Atlanta J & Const at Al (cited in note 3).
46 7 FCC Rec 7282 (1992).
47 Gilett Communications, 807 F Supp at 764.
41 Pepper, 7 FCC Rec at 5599.
4

Gillett Communications, 807 F Supp at 763.

80 Id.

51 Kate Maddox, TV Stations Sorting Through Court's Ruling on Fetus Ads, Electronic Media 10 (Nov 9, 1992). The Eleventh Circuit's decision is unpublished.
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preme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy denied Becker's request for
an emergency ruling one hour before the start of the game. 2
While WAGA-TV petitioned the District Court, Becker requested the FCC to intervene to ensure that he was granted access
to air the program." The FCC refused to intervene on Becker's
behalf, stating that the FCC does not "render indecency rulings in
advance of broadcasts. 5 4 Instead, the FCC deferred to the station's judgment that the advertisement was indecent, and thus did
not require the station to broadcast the advertisement.55 In so ruling, the FCC indicated that it will not require stations to broadcast
political advertisements that, in their judgment, fall within the
FCC's definition of indecency.
Because of the harms that obscene and indecent material pose
to privacy interests and to children, section 1464 should override
section 315. This would allow stations to refuse to run candidate
political advertisements that are obscene or indecent. However, because the usual aborted-fetus advertisement that does not depict a
live abortion is neither obscene nor indecent, and therefore does
not meet section 1464's standards, most aborted-fetus advertisements will not be censorable on these grounds. In most cases,
therefore, aborted-fetus advertisements will not fall within a possible obscenity or indecency exception to section 315.
B.

Violent Advertisements

Television stations voluntarily abide by guidelines promulgated by the National Association of Broadcasters ("NAB") in
1990, which consist of a four-part "Statement of Principles" concerning drug-related programs, children, violence, and indecency.5
These guidelines prohibit stations from showing violent or sexual
programs during family viewing hours, defined as the first hour of
prime time and the hour immediately preceding it, and encourage

" Id. This decision is unpublished.
5

Id.

Becker, 7 FCC Rec at 7282.
" The FCC defers to a station's judgment regarding what is indecent because it "cannot render indecency rulings in advance of broadcasts" under its interpretation of section
326's prohibition against prior restraints on speech. This decision is extremely unsatisfying
because stations may desire FCC guidance before broadcasting something that they think
may be indecent. By refusing to make an indecency determination before material is actually broadcast, the FCC fails to give stations proper guidance.
" See Remarks of Alfred C. Sikes, FCC Chairman, 1990 FCC LEXIS 4102, *7.
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stations to use viewer-discretion warnings and place the more violent and sexually explicit shows later in the evening. 7
Allowing stations to apply the NAB's violence guidelines to
political advertisements, particularly aborted-fetus advertisements,
would limit the broadcast of violent political advertisements during times when very young children watch television, and would
help parents make viewing decisions for their children. In contrast
to television programs, even conscientious parents who monitor
their children's viewing habits cannot foresee their children's exposure to a violent advertisement. When assessing what programs to
allow their children to watch, parents generally consider the program's subject matter, not advertisements. Allowing a child to
watch a game show or sporting event would normally pose little
danger of exposing the child to unexpected violence.5 8 However, an
unforeseen advertisement could expose children to violence that
the parent would consider inappropriate. Thus, violent advertisements pose a greater danger to children than violent television programs shown during daytime hours.
Subjecting graphic advertisements to the violence guidelines
would not relegate them to being aired at as late a time period as
an indecency determination would. Under the NAB guidelines, stations may broadcast violent programs after the first hour of prime
time, but may broadcast indecent material only during the nighttime safe-harbor period. 59 Thus, even if the NAB guidelines were
applied to political advertisements, candidates could show violent
advertisements to adult audiences that do not watch late-night television, an audience to which they would not be able to show "indecent" advertisements.
If violent advertisements were an exception to section 315,
aborted-fetus advertisements would probably be sufficiently violent to be channelled to later viewing times, although not exclusively to the safe-harbor period. The NAB guidelines instruct
broadcasters that "presentation of the details of violence should
'7 Among other

provisions, the NAB

urges that depictions of "physical or psychological" violence be used responsibly.
"Presentation of the details of violence should avoid the excessive, the gratuitous
and instructional . . . .The use of violence for its own sake and the detailed
dwelling upon brutality or physical agony, by sight or by sound, should be
avoided."
Doug Halonen, NAB Sets Standards for Cleaning Up Airwaves, Electronic Media 3 (June
25, 1990).
"8Nightline (cited in note 1).
" See note 22.
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detailed dwelling upon brutality or physical agony, by sight or by
sound, should be avoided.

' 60

Aborted-fetus advertisements graphi-

cally depict bloody, dismembered, and disfigured fetal body parts.
They present the "details of violence" by showing close-up images
of mutilated dead fetuses. As such, they would fall within the NAB
guidelines' prohibitions and would thus be relegated to later viewing hours.
Excessive violence, however, is probably not a viable exception
to section 315. Unlike the prohibitions against the broadcast of obscene or indecent material, there exists no congressional statutory
prohibition against violence on television. As such, violence is
probably very much like the defamatory material considered by
the Supreme Court in Farmers Educational.1 Indeed, the reasons
identified in Farmers Educational for not censoring political advertisements apply with more force in the violence context than
they do in the indecency context. While indecency determinations
are fairly unambiguous, requiring stations only to assess whether
the advertisement contains sexual acts, organs, profanity, or excrement, a determination of violence calls for more discretionary decisions, thus leaving the process open to abuse. The depiction of violence in political advertisements, therefore, probably does not
constitute an exception to section 315.
C.

Other Exceptions

There are three other possible exceptions to section 315's requirement that stations broadcast all candidate political advertisements uncensored: (1) political advertisements inciting violent
behavior; (2) misleading political advertisements; and (3) advertisements proffered by sham political candidates.
First, advertisements that incite violent behavior may constitute a possible exception to section 315. Under Brandenburg v
Ohio,6" a state may prohibit speech that "is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." 3 Because of the serious dangers to society that
would result from advertisements that are directed to and do incite
60 H alonen, Electronic Media at 3 (cited in note 57).
1 360 US at 525. See discussion of Farmers Educationalin notes 13-16 and 32-35 and

accompanying text.
*' 395 US 444 (1969).
' Id at 447 (citation omitted).
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violence, Brandenburg'sdictates should probably constitute an exception to section 315.
In In re Complaint by Atlanta NAACP Concerning Section
315 Political Broadcast by J.B. Stoner,64 the FCC refused to censor a political advertisement using the word "nigger" because
"there d[id] not appear to be that clear and present danger of imminent violence which might warrant interfering with speech
which does not contain any direct incitement to violence. '65 In so
holding, the FCC indicated that it might take action to censor a
political advertisement that calls for violence and presents a clear
and present danger of violence. This holding suggests, therefore,
that a station might be justified in refusing to run such an
advertisement.
Aborted-fetus advertisements, however, do not incite violence,
nor does there appear to exist a danger that their broadcast will
trigger an eruption of violence. Their damage is limited, instead, to
the possibility of causing hysteria in children"8 and causing severe
emotional distress,6 7 neither of which would be sufficiently harmful
under Brandenburg to justify limiting their broadcast.
Misleading political advertisements may constitute a second
possible exception to section 315. A frequent criticism of abortedfetus advertisements is that they are misleading. For example,
Janet Benshoof, of the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy,
has argued that candidates often "take a one-inch fetus and blow
it up across a 25-inch television screen and imply that that's really
what is being aborted in America."" Others have criticized candi64

36 FCC2d 635 (1972). In this case, the FCC considered the following political

advertisement:
I am J.B. Stoner. I am the only candidate for U.S. Senator who is for the white
people. I am the only candidate who is against integration. All of the other candidates are race mixers to one degree or another. I say we must repeal Gambrell's
civil rights law. Gambrell's law takes jobs from us whites and .gives those jobs to
the niggers. The main reason why niggers want integration is because the niggers
want our white women. I am for law and order with the knowledge that you cannot have law and order and niggers too. Vote white. This time vote your convictions by voting white racist J.B. Stoner into the run-off election for U.S. Senator.
Id at 636.
6 Id at 637.
66 Nightline (cited in note 1).
6 Mark van Louks, a former Vice President of United Cable Television, is suing Colorado senatorial candidate Matt Noah for intentional infliction of emotional distress caused
by Noah's aborted-fetus advertisements: "To me, this issue has very little to do with the
abortion issue. It has to do with what should or shouldn't be shown on television. This stuff
has a clear and present danger of inflicting harm on my kids and other children in this
community." Id.
68 Id.
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dates for featuring fetuses aborted during the third trimester, although such abortions are rare.69 Pro-life candidates counter, however, that such advertisements merely illustrate that aborted
fetuses are children70
Political aborted-fetus advertisements, however, should not be
censored because of their potentially misleading nature for several
reasons. First, most political advertisements are misleading to
some extent, and indeed some are clearly untrue. Second, there exists no congressional mandate analogous to section 1464 that prohibits the broadcast of misleading advertisements. Third, identifying misleading advertisements would require stations to conduct a
factual inquiry into the claims made by the candidate and to rectify any mistakes, a process made difficult by the time constraints
of a political campaign. Finally, in light of the Supreme Court's
rejection of station censorship of libelous material in Farmers
Educational, it is unlikely that the Court would allow stations to
censor merely misleading political advertisements. Such inaccuracies would best be left for opponents to counter.
Sham-candidate advertisements could constitute a third possible exception to section 315. Arguably, aborted-fetus advertisements need not be shown at all when they are produced by sham
candidates who have no right to reasonable access under section
312(a)(7). Evidence suggests that sections 312(a)(7) and 315 have
been abused by individuals who become candidates solely to force
stations to run their advertisements. For example, several of the
candidates who ran aborted-fetus advertisements may have entered the political race solely to get images of aborted fetuses on
the air.71 Where the mandatory-access requirement of section
312(a)(7) does not apply, television stations, in order to avoid of"' Whitford, Atlanta J and Const at A2 (cited in note 3). The Georgia candidates defended their decision to picture late-term abortions: "[T]hey were less graphic and upsetting
than earlier abortions." Id at A3. One of the candidates explained that "depicting earlier
abortions, for which the procedure is different, 'just isn't suitable. Babies with their heads
pulled off, with their arms pulled off. The pictures might make people throw up.'" Id, quoting Jimmy Fisher.
70 Nightline (cited in note 1).
" ABC News Nightline accused Indiana congressional candidate Michael Bailey of being such a candidate, stating that "[Bailey] will admit that he got into the race for the
purpose of getting the anti-abortion footage on the air." Indiana University Southeast Professor Thomas Wolf argued that "[Bailey] has corrupted the system, both from the standpoint of what we would ordinarily accept as being appropriate for television, and from a
standpoint of what the campaign should do, presenting issues, presenting differences of positions, in a rational, unemotional situation." Bailey, however, denied the charge. Nightline
(cited in note 1).
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fending their viewing public, routinely reject aborted-fetus advertisements promoted by pro-life organizations. 2
Although some individuals might abuse the system by becoming candidates solely to get their political message on the air, 73
such misuse of the campaign laws does not provide a sufficient basis for restricting the broadcast of aborted-fetus advertisements.
Distinguishing between actual candidates and sham candidates
would be extremely difficult. Additionally, even sham candidates
would undoubtedly serve if elected. Most importantly, however,
section 312(a)(7) provides reasonable access for "legally qualified
candidates." In order to be "legally qualified" under the Commission's rules, a candidate must: (a) be eligible under law to hold the
office he seeks; (b) announce his candidacy; and (c) qualify for a
place on the ballot or be eligible under law for election as a writein candidate. 74 Accordingly, under section 312(a)(7), even sham
candidates could properly qualify for access to broadcasting time.
Thus, sham candidacy is irrelevant under sections 312(a)(7) and
315. Even if some pro-life candidates for federal office enter a campaign solely to get aborted-fetus advertisements broadcast, they
could not be censored for that reason.
III. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Sections 312(a)(7) and 315, as currently construed, are too absolute because they allow children to be exposed to harmful material during the day simply because the material is contained in political advertisements. When political advertisements contain
images or language that is harmful to children, stations should not
be required to broadcast them under section 315. Indeed, images of
aborted fetuses may affect children more deeply than many things
72 Id. Indiana congressional candidate Michael Bailey first conceived of getting pictures
of aborted fetuses on the air by means of being a political candidate. Bailey explains: "I was
reading the law, the reasonable access law, that said if you are a federal candidate and you
run for high office in America, your television ads, by law, cannot be censored, they must be
aired during prime time, and they must be aired for the lowest political rate. And I went,
'Eureka, praise God, there's a way to get the truth on television.'" Id. See also Whitford,
Atlanta J and Const at Al (cited in note 3).
78 An extreme example would be a "sham" candidate who runs for office not to gain
television coverage of his political views, but rather to get inexpensive, prime-time commercial advertising. Section 315 requires that legally qualified candidates be sold air time at the
lowest unit charge during prime time. Thus, a company could run a candidate on, for example, the Wonderbread platform, with the candidate merely extolling the virtues of
Wonderbread.
74 CBS, Inc. v FCC, 453 US 367, 387 n 11 (1981). See also Primer on Political Broad-

casting and Cablecasting, 69 FCC2d 2209, 2216-18 (1978).
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that are currently considered indecent.75 The following proposals
for reform recognize that aborted-fetus advertisements should not
be broadcast in an entirely unrestricted manner. The proposals
could be adopted separately or in conjunction with one another.
A.

Amend Section 315

Congress has made clear that it would like to make the broadcast media better for children. It has sought to eliminate inappropriate material from the airwaves. Not only has Congress made the
broadcast of obscene or indecent material illegal under section
1464, but it has also enacted the Helms Adult Radio Act, which
prohibits the broadcast of indecent material 24-hours a day.7 6
Moreover, Congress recently passed the Television Program Improvement Act of 1990, 77 which exempts from the antitrust laws
any stations that engage in discussions on curbing excessive violence. Additionally, Congress has directed the FCC to monitor the
public interest when making licensing decisions.7
Congressional efforts to protect children are undermined by
political candidates who choose to air advertisements that are
harmful to children. Congress should amend section 315 to allow
broadcasters to refuse to broadcast a political advertisement that

7' For instance, five-year-old Sean Meyer became hysterical when Indiana congressional
candidate Michael Bailey's graphic abortion advertisement was aired during an afternoon
game show. Sean's father, Kert Meyer, explained: "Part of the trauma was the fact that he
had a newborn sister who, I think, he immediately, you know, transferred, 'Well, that's going to happen to my baby sister.' He didn't know what they were talking about." His
mother, Shannon Meyer, continued: "That's much too old for him. It's an adult topic, not a
child topic. This shouldn't be shown when children should be watching." Nightline (cited in
note 1). FCC Commissioner Andrew C. Barrett "particularly ha[s] concern about the impact
these graphic images might have on children in the broadcast audience. . . . [T]hese images
could cause far more damage to the psychological well-being of the child audience than any
of the programming the Commission to date has found to be indecent." Andrew C. Barrett,
Commissioner Barrett Issues Statement on Declaratory Ruling ConcerningReasonable Access, 1992 FCC LEXIS 6300, *2 (Nov 6, 1992).
" Helms Adult Radio Amendment, Pub L No 100-459, 102 Stat 2186 (1988). The
Amendment provided: "By January 31, 1989, the Federal Communications Commission
shall promulgate regulations in accordance with § 1464, title 18, United States Code, to
enforce the provisions of such section on a 24-hour per day basis." The FCC stated that it
would enforce 18 USC § 1464 on a 24-hour basis beginning on January 27, 1988. In the
Matter of Enforcement of ProhibitionsAgainst Broadcast Obscenity and Indecency In 18
USC § 1464, 4 FCC Rec 457 (1988). The D.C. Circuit, however, held that a 24-hour ban on
the broadcast of indecent material would be unconstitutional and that there must be a safeharbor period during the night during which stations could broadcast indecent material. See
note 22.
47 USC § 303(c) (1991).
7 The FCC makes its licensing decisions in accordance with 47 USC § 309.
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is either indecent or excessively violent. Such a change would not
significantly undermine the purposes of section 315; rather, it
would merely encourage political candidates to find less harmful
ways to express their views. While such a change would impose
some restrictions on a candidate's ability to disseminate his beliefs,
this interest is clearly outweighed by the harm to children that this
amendment seeks to prevent.
Even if Congress does not amend section 315, the FCC might
be able to achieve the same result. Section 315(d) instructs the
FCC to "prescribe appropriate rules and regulations to carry out
the provisions of this section."79 Until now, the FCC's rules and
regulations have not discussed the no-censorship aspect of section
315, and have instead limited dialogue to the equal-time and lowest-unit-charge provisions of section 315.80 The FCC may be able
to amend its rules and regulations to include guidelines for determining when the reasonable-access and no-censorship provisions
should be overridden by conflicting considerations. This is a particularly strong argument when conflicting congressional mandates
must be enforced by the FCC, as in the case of obscenity and indecency, on the one hand, and no-censorship on the other. This
course would curb the broadcast of inappropriate political advertisements and would probably effect change more quickly than
congressional action.
B. Expand the Definition of "Indecency"
The FCC's current "indecency" definition, which encompasses
only those materials portraying sexual organs, sexual acts, profanity, and excrement, is too limited because it does not include other
materials that are offensive to adults and harmful to children.
Pacifica allows the FCC to regulate the broadcast of indecent material in order to protect people from being confronted with offensive material in their homes and to protect children from exposure
to harmful material. 81 Neither of these reasons justifies restricting
the definition of "indecent" material to only those materials that
are sexual or excretory in nature. Rather, under Pacifica'sreasoning, the FCC should adopt a more expansive understanding of
"indecency."
47 USC § 315(d) (1988).
80 See In the Matter of Codification of the Commission's Political Programming Poli79

cies, 7 FCC Rec 678, 682 (1991).
0'
Pacifica, 438 US at 748-49.
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One way to expand the "indecency" definition would be to include particularly violent material within those materials that are
considered "indecent." Society generally agrees that children
should not be exposed to too much violence on television. Because
low-level violence is not clearly damaging, such material can be
monitored by conscientious parents. Excessive violence, however,
should be off-limits to children altogether. This approach has been
adopted by the Motion Picture Association of America in its
movie-rating system. The ratings, G, PG, PG-13, R, and NC-17,
are designed to help parents assess whether their children are sufficiently mature to watch a particular movie. For more violent or
sexual movies, however, children are not admitted into the theater
without an adult, or are not admitted at all.
The FCC should also expand its definition of indecency to include graphic images of dismembered and disfigured human bodies, including recognizably human fetuses. Close-up images of decapitated, dismembered, and disfigured human bodies may invade
privacy interests and be as, or more, harmful to children as the
word "shit"' 2 or many other things that are currently considered
indecent. Indeed, the offensive nature of gory images of aborted
fetuses is evidenced by the large number of complaints television
stations have received after airing graphic abortion advertisements. 8 The FCC should therefore expand its indecency definition
to encompass particularly violent material, including graphic
images of dismembered and disfigured human bodies and fetuses.
C.

Allow Stations to Channel Political Advertisements

The threat that aborted-fetus advertisements pose to young
children may be prevented in part by allowing stations to channel
all political advertisements away from certain children's shows, a
practice that may be permissible under current law. The FCC
should clarify that this is an acceptable way for stations to deal
with advertisements that they deem inappropriate for young children and encourage stations to adopt this strategy.
8" "Shit" is one of George Carlin's "seven dirty words" labeled "indecent" in Pacifica.
Id at 752.
'3 See notes 7-8 and accompanying text. Precisely because the visual images are disgusting and gory, many people, regardless of whether they are pro-life or pro-choice, are

offended when they see graphic aborted-fetus advertisements on television. In addition,
many people do not want their children to see such images. Children could be both disturbed and scared by seeing disfigured dead fetuses on television.
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Stations may refuse to broadcast all political advertisements
during certain television programs. For example, stations can bar
all political advertisements from news programs because of the
danger that viewers could interpret such advertisements as news
and thus get a distorted understanding of the news. 4 Stations may
also refuse to run all political advertisements during specials, because they would be unable to provide equal access to all candidates given the unique time constraints. 5 Stations may not, however, ban all political advertisements from prime time or from
whole dayparts5 8
Under current law, stations may be able to bar all political
advertisements from certain children's programs.8 7 The FCC has
not specifically considered whether stations may adopt this course
for children's programs, but has indicated that stations may not
alter the scheduling of political advertisements when they find
such advertisements to be unsuitable for children.8 8 This admonition, however, may be understood as holding only that stations
cannot deal individually with advertisements that they deem inappropriate for children. The FCC has therefore not foreclosed the
possibility that a station could ban all political advertisements
from certain shows such as children's programming.
The Supreme Court's decision in CBS, Inc. v FCC,9 likewise,
does not preclude the banning of all political advertisements from
children's shows. The Court, in CBS, prohibited stations from
adopting "blanket rules" to govern the broadcast of political advertisements." In so holding, CBS rejected a requirement that all
political advertisements be five minutes long because "[a] broadcaster's 'evenhanded' response of granting only time spots of a
fixed duration to candidates may be 'unreasonable' where a particular candidate desires less time for an advertisement or a longer
format to discuss substantive issues." 91 The blanket rules prohi" Commission's Political ProgrammingPolicies, 7 FCC Rec at 682.
8 The FCC recognizes "that it would be very difficult for a licensee to afford 'equal

opportunities' to opposing candidates if one candidate has his or her spot placed adjacent to
a highly rated program, which was broadcast only once or very rarely." Id.
80 Report and Order in the Matter of Commission Policy in Enforcing Section
312(a)(7) of the Communications Act, 68 FCC2d 1079 (1978).
87 The FCC has stated that "there may be circumstances when a licensee might reasonably refuse broadcast time to political candidates during certain parts of the broadcast day."
Commission's PoliticalProgramming Policies, 7 FCC Rec at 682.
88 Pepper, 7 FCC Rec at 5599.
o 453 US at 367.
"
Id at 389.
91 Id.
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bited by CBS, however, may be limited to format restrictions on
political advertisements and may not extend to bans on all advertisements from certain shows.
Channelling all political advertisements away from certain
children's shows is less troubling than simply channelling some of
them. Channelling all political advertisements away from children's shows would have little negative impact on section
312(a)(7)'s reasonable-access requirements, because it would not
disproportionately affect a candidate's ability to target the voting
public, which does not include children.92 Moreover, such a measure would not require stations to preview the political advertisements to make an independent determination that they are inappropriate for children, a practice which would violate section 315.
Additionally, such a rule would not disadvantage any one candidate more than another, because the rule would apply to all political advertising, not just to those advertisements that a station
deems inappropriate for children. 3
CONCLUSION

Graphic aborted-fetus advertisements are not appropriate for
young children to see. Section 315, however, requires that stations
broadcast uncensored candidate political advertisements depicting
aborted fetuses. As such, aborted-fetus advertisements reveal a
shortcoming in section 315.
Congress should amend section 315 to create an exception for
political advertisements that are offensive and inappropriate for
children, and the FCC should issue new guidelines along the same
lines. This would, at a minimum, ensure that stations could censor
"'

Irv Gastfreund, the attorney who represented broadcast stations in their attempt to

get aborted-fetus advertisements labelled as indecent, questions, "[W]hat legitimate purpose is being served in connection with furthering a candidate's campaign to make sure that

these kinds of very graphic depictions of aborted dead fetuses are targeted specifically at
children?" Nightline (cited in note 1). Such a ban on political advertisements during children's shows, however, could affect a candidate's ability to wean young audiences toward a
particular political stand. Indeed, some candidates may have tried to target child audiences
in order to convert them to the pro-life position.
" Professor Cass Sunstein argues that some neutral speech regulations may in fact be
viewpoint-based, in effect or in design. Cass R. Sunstein, Half-Truths of the First Amendment, 1993 U Chi Legal F 25. Under this Comment's proposed reforms, candidates who run
aborted-fetus advertisements will be affected more than candidates who do not. However,

the proposals focus on harm to children, not the views of the candidates. The harm prevented clearly outweighs the limited restriction on speech in the aborted-fetus advertisement context. Of course, any reform enacted to silence pro-life candidates rather than to

protect children would be illegitimate.
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obscene and indecent political advertisements without facing sanctions for doing so. The FCC should also expand its ,definition of
what is indecent to include graphic images of dismembered and
disfigured human bodies. In addition, the FCC should encourage
stations to restrict all political advertisements from television
shows watched primarily by very young children, because such a
regulation would protect children without seriously infringing the
right of political candidates to control their own campaigns.

